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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us to consider the unique and 
apparently unprecedented question of whether federal 
district courts have jurisdiction over consumer lawsuits 
brought under a federal statute that creates a private cause 
of action, is silent as to whether such actions can be 
brought in federal courts, but expressly refers consumer 
claims to state courts. Appellant ErieNet, Inc., an Internet 
service provider, and the individual appellants, ErieNet 
subscribers, brought suit in federal district court under the 
private enforcement provision of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. S 227. Appellants allege 
that appellees VelocityNet, Inc., another Internet service 
provider, and its agents and employees sent unsolicited e- 
mail messages to ErieNet subscribers in violation of the 
TCPA. Because the TCPA refers such consumer suits to 
state courts, the district court concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and we will exercise plenary review. See Growth 
Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Enacted in 1991 as part of the Federal Communications 
Act, the TCPA seeks to deal with an increasingly common 
nuisance -- telemarketing. More than 300,000 solicitors 
call more than 18,000,000 Americans each day. See 47 
U.S.C. S 227, Congressional finding No. 3. By 1991, over 
half the states had enacted statutes restricting the 
marketing uses of the telephone. However, Congress 
recognized that "telemarketers can evade [state] 
prohibitions through interstate operation; therefore, Federal 
law is needed to control residential telemarketing 
practices." 47 U.S.C. S 227, Congressionalfinding No. 7; 
see also S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 5 (1991), reprinted in, 
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1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1973 ("The Committee believes 
that Federal legislation is necessary to protect the public 
from automated telephone calls . . . Federal action is 
necessary because the States do not have the jurisdiction 
to protect their citizens against those who use these 
machines to place interstate telephone calls."). 
 
Accordingly, Congress enacted the TCPA, which 
prohibits, inter alia, various uses of automatic telephone 
dialing systems, the initiation of certain telephone calls 
using artificial or prerecorded voices, and the use of any 
device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone 
facsimile machine. See 47 U.S.C. S 227(b).1 Under S 227(f), 
states may bring civil actions in federal court on behalf of 
their residents for violations of the TCPA. In addition, the 
statute expressly creates a private right of action: 
 
       A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the 
       laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an 
       appropriate court of that State-- 
       (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection 
       or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to 
       enjoin such violation, 
       (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from 
       such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for 
       each such violation, whichever is greater, or 
       (C) both such actions. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 227(b)(3). Senator Hollings, the sponsor of the 
bill, stated: 
 
       The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action 
       provision that will make it easier for consumers to 
       recover damages from receiving these computerized 
       calls. The provision would allow consumers to bring an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although this litigation relates to unsolicited e-mail messages, 
appellants seek to apply the provision of the TCPA prohibiting the use of 
any device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile 
machine. Appellants contend that this provision applies to the facts of 
this case because the e-mail messages were sent by a computer, were 
unsolicited advertisements, and were sent to ErieNet's computer 
network, which constitutes a telephone facsimile machine within the 
meaning of the TCPA. 
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       action in State court against any entity that violates the 
       bill. The bill does not, because of constitutional 
       constraints, dictate to the States which court in each 
       State shall be the proper venue for such an action, as 
       this is a matter for state legislators to determine. 
       Nevertheless, it is my hope that the States will make it 
       as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions, 
       preferably in small claims court. The consumer outrage 
       at receiving these calls is clear. Unless Congress makes 
       it easier for consumers to obtain damages from those 
       who violate this bill, these abuses will undoubtedly 
       continue. 
 
       Small claims court or a similar court would allow the 
       consumer to appear before the court without an 
       attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is 
       set to be fair to both the consumer and the 
       telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of 
       the bill if the attorneys' costs to consumers of bringing 
       an action were greater than the potential damages. I 
       thus expect that the States will act reasonably in 
       permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this 
       bill. 
 
137 Cong. Rec. S16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) 
(statement of Sen. Hollings) (emphasis added). 
 
Although actual monetary losses from telemarketing 
abuses are likely to be minimal, this private enforcement 
provision puts teeth into the statute by providing for 
statutory damages and by allowing consumers to bring 
actions on their own. Consumers who are harassed by 
telemarketing abuses can seek damages themselves, rather 
than waiting for federal or state agencies to prosecute 
violations. Although S 227(f)(1) of the statute does authorize 
states to bring actions on their citizens' behalf, the sheer 
number of calls made each day -- more than 18,000,000 -- 
would make it impossible for government entities alone to 
completely or effectively supervise this activity. 
 
II. 
 
We recognize at the outset that the circumstances of this 
case are unique. We are confronted with "an unusual 
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constellation of statutory features." Chair King, Inc. v. 
Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1997). 
A federal statute creates a private cause of action. The 
statute is not silent as to where such actions may be 
brought; rather, it refers potential plaintiffs to the state 
courts. Neither the text nor the legislative history makes 
any reference to federal courts. Furthermore, the statute 
does not appear to reflect any significant federal interest, or 
one that is uniquely federal. It does not reflect an attempt 
by Congress to occupy this field of interstate 
communication or to promote national uniformity of 
regulation. Rather, Congress recognized that state 
regulation of telemarketing activity was ineffective because 
it could be avoided by interstate operations. Federal 
legislation was necessary in order to prevent telemarketers 
from evading state restrictions. See Van Bergen v. 
Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1548 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 
This statutory scheme is significant because a district 
court's federal question jurisdiction is dependent on an act 
of Congress. "While Article III of the Constitution authorizes 
judicial power of `cases, in law and equity, arising under' 
. . . the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States, the district courts have only that jurisdiction that 
Congress grants through statute." International Science & 
Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 
1146, 1153 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 
441, 449 (1850)). The question, therefore, is whether 
Congress has provided for federal court jurisdiction over 
consumer suits under the TCPA. To answer that question, 
we first examine whether the TCPA itself reflects Congress' 
intent to grant federal jurisdiction. If the TCPA does not 
reflect such an intent, we must then consider whether 
some other statute authorizes federal jurisdiction under 
these circumstances. In considering these questions, we 
keep in mind the "fundamental precept that federal courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal 
jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by 
Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded." Owen 
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). 
 
A. 
 
Every court of appeals to consider the question has held 
that the TCPA does not grant federal court jurisdiction over 
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the private causes of action at issue in this litigation. See 
Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1287- 
88 (11th Cir.), modified, 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Chair King, 131 F.3d at 509; International Science, 106 F.3d 
at 1150. But see Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1162, 1164 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (rejecting the International 
Science analysis and finding federal jurisdiction over private 
enforcement actions under the TCPA). Appellants 
nonetheless argue that the statute does reflect Congress' 
intent to create a private right of action that may be 
brought in federal court, and that nothing in the text or 
legislative history expressly precludes federal court 
jurisdiction. 
 
In interpreting a statute, we are charged with the duty to 
consider the provisions of the whole law, its object, and its 
policy. See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. 
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 
(1993) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 
113, 122 (1849)). Furthermore, we must construe the 
statute " `so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that 
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.' " Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Snider, 29 
F.3d 886, 895 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction S 46.06, at 119-20 (5th 
ed. 1992) (citations omitted)). Guided by these principles, 
we join the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in 
concluding that Congress intended that private enforcement 
suits under the TCPA be brought in state, and not federal, 
courts. 
 
Appellants note that Congress stated only that private 
rights of action "may" be brought in state court. See 47 
U.S.C. S 227(b)(3). Appellants argue that such permissive 
language does not limit jurisdiction to state courts, and 
therefore leaves federal jurisdiction intact. We decline to 
attribute this logic or intent to Congress. In Tafflin v. Levitt, 
493 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990), the Supreme Court 
recognized that there is a presumption in favor of state 
court jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law. The 
Court held that an express grant of federal jurisdiction over 
civil RICO claims did not oust the state courts of 
jurisdiction. See id. at 460-61. While state courts would 
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have had jurisdiction over private TCPA actions even if 
Congress had made no reference to state courts, we 
conclude that Congress referred these claims to state court 
as forcefully as it could, given the constitutional difficulties 
associated with Congress' mandating a resort to state 
courts. See 137 Cong. Rec. S16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 
1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
 
The appellants' argument that the permissive reference to 
state courts implies the existence of federal jurisdiction is 
undercut by the fact that there is no presumption of 
jurisdiction in the federal courts. See Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 
442 (noting that federal court jurisdiction must be 
authorized by Congress). State courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction, while federal courts are courts of only limited 
jurisdiction. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, "[i]f a statute 
authorizes suit in state courts of general jurisdiction 
through the use of the term `may,' that authorization 
cannot confer jurisdiction on a federal court because 
federal courts are competent to hear only those cases 
specifically authorized." International Science, 106 F.3d at 
1151 (citing Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449). The permissive 
authorization of jurisdiction in state courts does not imply 
that jurisdiction is also authorized in federal courts. For 
Congress' reference to state courts to have any meaning, it 
must reflect something other than a mere confirmation of 
concurrent jurisdiction over private enforcement actions. 
We believe that the most natural reading of this language is 
that Congress intended to authorize private causes of 
action only in state courts, and to withhold federal 
jurisdiction.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because of the differences between the respective jurisdictions of 
state 
and federal courts, we do not place great reliance on Tafflin as setting 
forth a doctrinal guide for our analysis here. It is in this respect that 
we 
disagree with our dissenting colleague. The Supreme Court in Tafflin 
traced the historical roots of concurrent jurisdiction, emphasizing the 
principle that " `nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents 
state courts from enforcing rights created by federal law.' " 493 U.S. at 
459 (quoting Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962)). 
The Court thus recognized "a deeply rooted presumption" in favor of 
concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of action, and noted the rare 
and unique situations in which that presumption will be held to have 
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Our review of the other provisions of the statute supports 
this reading. It is apparent from a review of the TCPA and 
the Communications Act that Congress consciously drew 
careful jurisdictional distinctions. For example, in 
S 227(f)(2) of the TCPA, Congress expressly mandates 
exclusive federal court jurisdiction over TCPA actions 
brought by states on behalf of their residents. The statute 
specifically addresses venue, service of process, and 
possible conflicts with FCC enforcement efforts. See 47 
U.S.C. S S 227(f)(4) & (7). In S 227(b)(3), however, Congress 
does not even allude to these issues in connection with the 
private enforcement action at issue here. The Fifth Circuit 
has interpreted this as an indication of Congress' intent to 
limit such private actions to state courts. See Chair King, 
131 F.3d at 512. In other parts of the Communications Act, 
where Congress intended to authorize concurrent 
jurisdiction, it did so expressly.3 Its failure to provide for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
been overcome. Id. Tafflin spoke only to the issue of whether state court 
jurisdiction, which is presumed, could be ousted or divested, while the 
issue before us is whether federal jurisdiction, which must be provided 
for by Congress, does in fact exist. 
 
Thus, we believe that the reasoning of Tafflin does not, as the dissent 
asserts, transfer to the instant legislation which, in referring consumer 
suits to state courts, does not provide for any jurisdiction in federal 
court. Given the fact that state court concurrent jurisdiction is 
presumed, while federal jurisdiction must be provided for, the Tafflin 
reasoning is not easily borrowed in this context. Further, the Tafflin 
test 
for divestment is not susceptible to application under our facts because, 
again, the Tafflin Court was speaking only to the issue of overcoming the 
presumption of state court jurisdiction, not as is the case here, 
determining whether Congress intended federal courts to have 
jurisdiction under S 1331, or had indicated a contrary intention that 
jurisdiction should not lie in federal court under S 1331. 
 
3. See 47 U.S.C. S 214(c) (any court of competent jurisdiction may issue 
injunction); 47 U.S.C. S 407 (authorizing suit for carrier's noncompliance 
with order for payment in United States district court or in any state 
court of general jurisdiction); 47 U.S.C. S 415(f) (establishing one year 
statute of limitations for petitions brought to enforce order for payment 
of money in federal or state court); 47 U.S.C. S 553(c)(1) (authorizing 
suit 
for unauthorized cable reception in United States district court or any 
other court of competent jurisdiction); 47 U.S.C. S555(a) (authorizing 
review of decisions of a franchising authority in United States district 
court or any state court of competent jurisdiction); 47 U.S.C. 
S 605(e)(3)(A) (authorizing suit for unauthorized publication in United 
States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction). 
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concurrent jurisdiction under S 227(b)(3) of the TCPA is 
therefore significant. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512; 
International Science, 106 F.3d at 1152 (finding significance 
in Congress' failure to refer to federal jurisdiction in S 227, 
as compared to the express grants of concurrent 
jurisdiction in other parts of the Communications Act). 
 
Finally, appellants argue that we should interpret S 227 
as providing for a private cause of action in federal court 
because this is consistent with, and would serve, the 
underlying purposes of the TCPA to protect the public from 
telemarketing abuses, to supplement state jurisdiction over 
the proscribed activity, and to provide a private right of 
action. However, the mere need for federal legislation and 
provision of remedies does not give a right of access to a 
federal forum. Federal legislation was deemed necessary 
because telemarketers could avoid state legislation by 
engaging in interstate operations, not because Congress 
recognized a significant federal interest deserving of 
protection in federal courts. See 47 U.S.C.S 227, 
Congressional finding No. 7; S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 5, 
reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1973; see also 
VanBergen, 59 F.3d at 1548. 
 
Furthermore, Senator Hollings' statements indicate that 
an overriding concern in the creation of the private right of 
action was to make it easier for consumers to recover 
damages -- "preferably in small claims court." 137 Cong. 
Rec. S16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Hollings). The implication is that suits in courts other than 
state small claims courts would be more costly and 
burdensome to consumers. The entire focus of Senator 
Hollings' statement is on state courts. It does not appear 
that he, the bill's sponsor, contemplated private 
enforcement actions in federal courts. We agree with the 
Fourth Circuit that "the clear thrust of his statement was 
consistent with the bill's text that state courts were the 
intended fora for private TCPA actions." International 
Science, 106 F.3d at 1153. 
 
Thus, looking to the statute as a whole, and attempting 
to give effect to every provision, we find that the explicit 
reference to state courts, and the absence of any reference 
 
                                9 
  
to federal courts, reflects Congress' intent to withhold 
jurisdiction over such consumer suits in federal court. 
 
B. 
 
Appellants argue that it is not necessary that the TCPA 
itself confer federal jurisdiction over private rights of action. 
Rather, appellants contend that, regardless of the TCPA, 
jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, which 
gives district courts jurisdiction over "civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States." The term "arising under" eludes precise definition. 
Justice Holmes articulated the most common definition: "[a] 
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." 
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 
257, 260 (1916). More recently, this court has recognized 
two tests that generally apply to a court's assessment of 
federal question jurisdiction. See Virgin Islands Housing 
Auth. v. Coastal General Constr. Serv. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 
916 (3d Cir. 1994). "First, the question is whether federal 
law creates the cause of action. If not, the second inquiry 
is whether the complaint poses a substantial federal 
question." Id. (citing West 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 
14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 1987)). See 
also Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). Appellants argue that their 
complaint satisfies both these tests in that,first, the TCPA 
creates the cause of action, and second, since the claims 
asserted in the complaint require the construction of the 
TCPA, a substantial federal question is posed. 
 
In connection with the first question, here federal law 
does create the cause of action. However, the fact that 
federal law creates the cause of action does not necessarily 
end the inquiry regarding the existence of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction. Although S 1331 functions as a general 
grant of jurisdiction to district courts of cases in which the 
cause of action was created by federal law, "it does not 
mean that jurisdiction is not precluded by another statute 
or doctrine of judicial administration." First Jersey 
Securities, Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(finding that failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
precludes district court jurisdiction). Accordingly, "[t]o 
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establish a cause of action in district court under section 
1331 [the plaintiffs] must show first that their action . . . 
`arises under' . . . [federal law] and second that section 
1331 jurisdiction is not preempted by a more specific 
statutory provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction 
elsewhere." Connors v. Amax Coal Co., Inc., 858 F.2d 1226, 
1229-30 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that, even if plaintiff's 
claims arose under ERISA or federal common law, S 1331 
could not supersede provisions of Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act and Black Lung Benefits Act 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals). 
For example, federal statutes frequently assign jurisdiction 
to a court other than the federal district courts. See, e.g., 
28 U.S.C. S 1491(a)(1) (assigning jurisdiction of certain 
takings claims to the Court of Federal Claims); 29 U.S.C. 
S 160(f) (assigning original jurisdiction to review agency 
orders under the National Labor Relations Act to federal 
courts of appeals). By virtue of such a specific reference or 
assignment, Congress negates district court jurisdiction 
under S 1331.4 Although the TCPA is certainly unique in 
that it refers litigants to the jurisdiction of a state court 
rather than another federal court, the principle is the same. 
 
We recognize that, given S 1331's general grant of federal 
question jurisdiction, Congress could have more clearly 
expressed its intent in the TCPA to decline to provide 
jurisdiction for these consumer suits in district court. 
However, we have never before required Congress, when 
assigning jurisdiction to a court other than the district 
court, to state that the district court is without jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We decline to apply the Tafflin Court's analysis of the divestment of 
state court jurisdiction to our S 1331 analysis. The federal courts' S 
1331 
jurisdiction is not equivalent to the general jurisdiction of state 
courts. 
Congress itself conferred federal question jurisdiction on district courts 
in S 1331. By contrast, state courts do not have jurisdiction over federal 
causes of action because of any act of Congress. Rather, "state courts 
have inherent authority . . . to adjudicate claims arising under the laws 
of the United States." Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458. The mere fact that S 1331 
creates federal question jurisdiction does not mean that it creates any 
presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction in particular cases. With 
respect to the withholding of federal jurisdiction, in contrast to the 
divestment of state jurisdiction, there is no requirement that a statement 
of Congressional intent be explicit or unmistakable. 
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See Public Util. Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 
F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (noting 
that "jurisdiction over a specific class of claims which 
Congress has committed to the court of appeals generally is 
exclusive, even in the absence of an express statutory 
command of exclusiveness"). To find federal court 
jurisdiction here would not only be contrary to the clear 
intent of Congress, but also would represent a departure 
from well-established principles reflecting a reluctance to 
find federal jurisdiction unless it is clearly provided for. As 
federal courts are courts of only limited jurisdiction, there 
is a general presumption against federal jurisdiction which 
a plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting. See Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, statutes purporting to 
confer federal jurisdiction are to be construed narrowly, 
with ambiguities resolved against a finding of federal 
jurisdiction. See Mars Inc v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Conlux, 24 
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Boelens v. Redman 
Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations 
omitted). We conclude that because the TCPA reflects 
Congress' intent to authorize consumer suits in state courts 
only, and because it is "a more specific statutory provision 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere," appellants 
cannot rely on the general federal question jurisdiction of 
S 1331. 
 
In addition, we note that appellants' argument that 
federal question jurisdiction is proper because the 
complaint poses a substantial federal question seems 
misplaced in these circumstances. Generally, courts refer to 
this test when the first test is not met, namely, when there 
is no federal cause of action. See, e.g., Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809-10 
(1986); Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 13 (considering 
federal subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action 
created by state law that implicates a question of federal 
law). Here, however, federal law is the source of appellants' 
cause of action, but refers litigants to state courts only. 
Thus, regardless of the presence of a substantial federal 
question, Congress' intent to preclude consumer suits 
under TCPA in federal court trumps the general grant of 
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federal question jurisdiction in S 1331. See Connors, 858 
F.2d at 1229-30; First Jersey Securities, 605 F.2d at 694. 
 
Appellants also contend that federal jurisdiction is 
authorized by 28 U.S.C. S 1337(a), which provides that 
"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress 
regulating commerce . . . ." The same tests for determining 
whether an action "arises under" federal law for purposes of 
S 1331 apply to determine whether an action"arises under" 
an Act of Congress regulating commerce. See Franchise Tax 
Board, 463 U.S. at 8 n. 7 (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
any action that could be brought in federal court under 
S 1337 could also be brought under S 1331. See 13 Charles 
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 3574, at 
235. When first enacted, S 1337 nonetheless served an 
important function because, unlike S 1331, it did not 
include an amount in controversy requirement. See id. at 
238. As this was the only function ever served byS 1337, 
Congress' elimination of S 1331's amount in controversy 
requirement rendered the grant of jurisdiction inS 1337 
superfluous. See id. 
 
In this case, appellants' argument that S 1337 authorizes 
federal jurisdiction fails for the same reason that their 
argument under S 1331 fails. Like S 1331, S 1337 is a 
general jurisdictional statute. As such, it can be supplanted 
by another statute that assigns jurisdiction elsewhere. See 
Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 655 F.2d 131, 133 
(8th Cir. 1981); Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United 
States, 629 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1980). Congress' intent 
to limit consumer suits under the TCPA to state courts 
supersedes the general grant of jurisdiction in S 1337. 
 
Finally, appellants argue that since the statute does not 
clearly state whether a private cause of action may be 
brought in federal court, a Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), 
analysis should apply to determine whether a federal cause 
of action should be inferred from the statute.5 That 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court in Cort v. Ash identified several factors as relevant to a 
determination of whether a private cause of action is implicit in a 
statute 
that does not expressly create one: 
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analysis, however, is directed at a different question from 
the one we address. The Cort v. Ash factors probe whether 
a private right of action can be implied from a statute that 
does not expressly create one. In this case, a private right 
of action is clearly created; the uncertainty relates only to 
the proper forum for that action. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the question of whether a statute creates a 
private right of action is distinct from the question of 
whether a federal court has jurisdiction: 
 
       [T]he threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak 
       Act or any other provision of law creates a cause of 
       action whereby a private party such as the respondent 
       can enforce duties and obligations imposed by the Act; 
       for it is only if such a right of action exists that we 
       need consider whether the respondent had standing to 
       bring the action and whether the District Court had 
       jurisdiction to entertain it. 
 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974); see also Keaukaha- 
Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 
588 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 
To the extent that Cort v. Ash does inform our 
jurisdictional analysis, it teaches that our focal point must 
be Congress' intent. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 
174, 179 (1988). The Cort v. Ash analysis illustrates that in 
attempting to discern Congress' intent, we must consider 
that which is implicit, as well as that which is explicit, in 
a statute. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial 
benefit the 
       statute was enacted' . . . ? Second, is there any indication of 
       legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a 
remedy 
       or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying 
purposes 
       of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 
       And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to 
state 
       law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it 
would 
       be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal 
       law? 
 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
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Congress intended to refer private litigants under the TCPA 
to state court, and to preclude federal question jurisdiction 
over such consumer suits. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court dismissing this case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
It is undisputed that the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. S 227, a federal statute, creates a 
private right of action on behalf of a person or entity 
victimized by telemarketing abuse. Such an action is 
plainly one "arising under the . . . laws . . . of the Unites 
States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1331, the general 
federal question jurisdiction statute. The majority, however, 
holds that the district courts do not have jurisdiction to 
entertain private TCPA actions under section 1331 because 
47 U.S.C S 227(b)(3) in effect divests the federal courts of 
jurisdiction. But section 227(b)(3) says nothing about the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts; instead, it says 
merely that an action under that provision "may" be 
brought in an appropriate state court "if otherwise 
permitted by the laws or rules of court of" that state. More 
than this, it seems to me, is needed to divest a federal 
district court of its jurisdiction under section 1331. Indeed, 
I think that the Supreme Court's decision in Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990), clearly shows that the majority 
has erred. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
In Tafflin, the Supreme Court interpreted the following 
provision from the federal RICO statute: 
 
       Any person injured in his business or property by 
       reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter 
       may sue therefor in any appropriate United States 
       district court. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1964 (emphasis added). The Court found that 
this language was insufficient to divest state courts of 
concurrent jurisdiction over private RICO actions, 
explaining: 
 
       [The statute's] grant of federal jurisdiction is plainly 
       permissive, not mandatory, for the statute does not 
       state nor even suggest that such jurisdiction shall be 
       exclusive. It provides that suits of the kind described 
       "may" be brought in the federal district courts, not that 
       they must be. 
 
Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 796 (internal quotations omitted). 
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, it is clear that 
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the language of the TCPA is insufficient to divest district 
courts of their federal question jurisdiction, as the statute 
merely provides that private suits "may" be brought in state 
court. See 47 U.S.C. S 227(b)(3). 
 
The majority, however, declines to apply the reasoning of 
Tafflin on the ground that Tafflin concerned divestment of 
state court jurisdiction whereas this case concerns 
divestment of federal court jurisdiction. According to the 
majority, because "[s]tate courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction, while federal courts are courts of only limited 
jurisdiction[,] . . . [t]he permissive authorization of 
jurisdiction in state courts does not imply that jurisdiction 
is also authorized in federal courts."1  Maj. Op. at 7. This 
observation, while entirely accurate, is irrelevant to the 
issue before us. The appellants are not arguing that the 
TCPA authorizes federal jurisdiction by implication. Rather, 
the appellants simply maintain that the TCPA does not 
divest district courts of the federal question jurisdiction 
they already possess under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. 2 Although the 
majority eventually confronts this issue in Part IIB of its 
opinion, it fails to explain in that section why it does not 
apply the Tafflin Court's divestment analysis.3 
 
By sidestepping Tafflin, the majority is able to conclude 
that Congress's reference to state courts in the TCPA "must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See also International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom 
Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1151-52 (4th Cir. 1997) ("If a 
statute authorizes suit in state courts of general jurisdiction through 
the 
use of the term `may,' that authorization cannot confer jurisdiction on a 
federal court because federal courts are competent to hear only those 
cases specifically authorized."). 
 
2. In light of the fact that district courts have possessed general 
federal 
question jurisdiction since 1875, see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 
412, 420 (1988), I am somewhat puzzled by the majority's reliance on 
"well-established principles reflecting a reluctance to find federal 
jurisdiction unless it is clearly provided for." Maj. Op. at 12. 
 
3. The majority's reliance on the divestment analysis in Public Util. 
Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 1985), 
is misplaced. The statute at issue in Bonneville, unlike the TCPA, 
contained mandatory language assigning jurisdiction to another court. 
See id. at 626 (quoting 16 U.S.C. S 839f(e)(5) ("Suits . . . shall be 
filed in 
the United States court of appeals for the region.")) (emphasis added). 
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reflect something other than a mere confirmation of 
concurrent jurisdiction." Maj. Op. at 7. The Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits have likewise found it "meaningful that 
Congress explicitly mentioned only state courts" since 
"mentioning state courts is unnecessary to vest them with 
concurrent jurisdiction." International Science, 106 F.3d at 
1152. See Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 
F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1997). The problem with this view 
is that it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision 
in Tafflin. Just as it was unnecessary for Congress to 
mention state courts in the TCPA in order to vest them with 
concurrent jurisdiction, it was unnecessary for Congress to 
mention federal district courts in the RICO statute in order 
to vest them with concurrent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of the 
United States."). Nevertheless, the Tafflin  Court concluded 
that the RICO statute's explicit mention of district courts 
was not "meaningful" enough to vest them with exclusive 
jurisdiction. I would similarly conclude that the TCPA's 
explicit mention of state courts is not meaningful enough to 
vest them with exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
The Supreme Court has long abided by the "general rule 
that the grant of jurisdiction to one court does not, of itself, 
imply that the jurisdiction is to be exclusive." United States 
v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479 (1936). 
Consistent with this principle, the Tafflin Court concluded 
that the RICO statute's permissive grant of jurisdiction to 
federal district courts did not constitute an "explicit 
statutory directive" sufficient to divest state courts of their 
inherent federal question jurisdiction. 493 U.S. at 460-61. 
Likewise, I would hold that the TCPA's permissive grant of 
jurisdiction to state courts does not constitute an"explicit 
statutory directive" sufficient to divest district courts of 
their section 1331 federal question jurisdiction. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear textual divestment in 
the TCPA, the Supreme Court has instructed that 
jurisdiction can also be divested "by unmistakable 
implication from legislative history." Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 
460. In this regard, the majority finds that Senator 
Hollings's statement reveals Congress' clear intention to 
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grant exclusive jurisdiction to the state courts. I disagree. 
I do not believe that one speech given by one senator is 
sufficient to demonstrate the "unmistakable" intent of 
Congress. Moreover, even if Senator Hollings's statement 
were given controlling weight, it merely indicates that the 
TCPA was designed to "allow consumers to bring an action 
in State court." 137 Cong. Rec. S16205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 
1991) (emphasis added). The Senator explained that giving 
consumers the option of going to small claims court would 
enable them to seek modest damages without incurring the 
high costs of formal litigation. Id. However, the Senator said 
nothing about preventing corporate adversaries who are 
battling over large sums of money from choosing to go to 
federal court. Therefore, I would not conclude that Senator 
Hollings's statement does anything more than confirm the 
permissive grant of state jurisdiction found in the statute's 
text. 
 
I am also unconvinced by the majority's contention that 
the overall statutory scheme of the TCPA supports its 
finding of exclusive state court jurisdiction. The majority 
first notes that another section of the TCPA specifically 
"mandates exclusive federal court jurisdiction over TCPA 
actions brought by states on behalf of their residents." Maj. 
Op. at 8 (citing 47 U.S.C. S 227(f)(2)). I agree that this 
explicit grant of exclusive jurisdiction is significant, but I 
believe that it cuts against the majority's conclusion. 
Section 227(f)(2) reveals that, while drafting the TCPA, 
Congress knew full well how to grant exclusive jurisdiction 
with mandatory language. The most natural interpretation 
of Congress' failure to use similar language in section 
227(b)(3) is that Congress did not intend to grant exclusive 
jurisdiction in that section. 
 
The majority also relies on sections 227(f)(4) and 227(f)(7) 
of the TCPA, which specifically address venue, service of 
process, and possible conflicts between federal and state 
enforcement efforts. The majority finds significance in the 
fact that these issues are not discussed in connection with 
the private right of action granted by section 227(b)(3). 
However, since the general rules governing venue and 
service of process in the district courts are well established, 
see 28 U.S.C. S 1391(b); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 4, 4.1, there 
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was no need for Congress to reiterate them in section 
227(b)(3). The fact that venue and service of process are 
discussed in section 227(f)(4) and not section 227(b)(3) 
simply indicates that Congress wished to make 
adjustments to the general rules in the former section and 
not the latter. As for the conflict provision that appears in 
section 227(f) but not section 227(b)(3), it is hardly 
surprising that Congress would be concerned about agency 
conflicts in the section of the TCPA dealing with official 
state enforcement efforts but not in the section governing 
private lawsuits. 
 
Finally, the majority points to other provisions in the 
Communications Act in which Congress expressly provided 
for concurrent jurisdiction. According to the majority, these 
provisions render Congress' "failure to provide for 
concurrent jurisdiction under S 227(b)(3) . . . significant." 
Maj. Op. at 8-9. However, because these provisions of the 
Communications Act were not passed contemporaneously 
with the TCPA, they shed little light on the intent of 
Congress at the time of the TCPA's passage. 
 
In the end, the majority fails to give any convincing 
reason for finding that the permissive grant of jurisdiction 
to state courts in the TCPA divests district courts of the 
jurisdiction they possess under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Moreover, 
by rejecting the applicability of the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Tafflin, the majority reaches the odd 
conclusion that divestments of federal court jurisdiction 
over federal claims should be more easily found than 
divestments of state court jurisdiction over federal claims. 
In light of the longstanding and explicit grant of federal 
question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. S 1331, I would instead 
conclude that a divestment of district court jurisdiction 
should be as reluctantly found as a divestment of state 
court jurisdiction. Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
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